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1.  Introduction 
We first review, in Meta-theorem 1, the proof of a standard Deduction Theorem - ([T], 
[A])|-K [B] if, and only if, [T]|-K [A => B] (cf. [Me64], Corollary 2.6, p61) - of classical4, 
first-order, theories, where an explicit deduction of [B]5 from ([T], [A]) is known.  
We then show, in Corollary 1.2, that, assuming Church’s Thesis, Meta-theorem 1 can be 
constructively extended to cases where, ([T], [A])|-K [B] is established meta-
mathematically, assuming the consistency of ([T], [A]), but where an explicit deduction 
of [B] from ([T], [A]) is not known. 
We finally argue, in Meta-theorem 2, that: 
([T], [A])|-K [B] holds if, and only if, [T]|-K [B] holds when we assume [T]|-K [A]. 
(In other words, that [B] is a deduction from ([T], [A]) in K if, and only if, whenever [A]6 
is a hypothetical deduction from [T] in K, [B] is a deduction from [T] in K.) 
2.  A standard Deduction Theorem 
The following is, essentially, Mendelson’s proof of a standard Deduction Theorem 
([Me64], p61, Proposition 2.4 and Corollary 2.6) of an arbitrary first order theory K: 
                                               
4 We take Mendelson [Me64] as representative, in the area that it covers, of standard expositions of 
classical, first order, logic. 
 
5 We use square brackets to differentiate between a formal expression [F] and its interpretation “F”, where 
we follow Mendelson’s definition of an interpretation M of a formal theory K, and of the interpretation of a 
formula of K under M ([Me64], p49, §2). For instance, we use [n] to denote the numeral in K whose 
standard interpretation is the natural number n. 
 
6 For the purposes of this essay, we assume everywhere that [T] is an abbreviation for a finite set of K-
formulas {[T1], [T2], ... [Tl]}, whereas [A], [B], ... are closed well-formed formulas of K. We note, also, that 
“[A] & [B]” and “[A & B]” denote the same K-formula. 
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Meta-theorem 1: If [T] is a set of well-formed formulas of an arbitrary first order theory 
K, and if [A] is a closed well-formed formula of K, and if ([T], [A])|-K [B], then [T]|-K [A 
=> B]7. 
Proof: Let <[B1], [B2], ..., [Bn]> be a deduction of [B] from ([T], [A]) in K.  
Then, by definition, [Bn] is [B] and, for each i, either [Bi] is an axiom of K, or [Bi] is in 
[T], or [Bi] is [A], or [Bi] is a direct consequence by some rules of inference of K of some 
of the preceding well-formed formulas in the sequence. 
We now show, by induction, that [T]|-K [A => Bi] for each i =< n. As inductive 
hypothesis, we assume that the proposition is true for all deductions of length less than n. 
(i) If [Bi] is an axiom, or belongs to [T], then [T]|-K [A => Bi], since [Bi => (A => 
Bi)] is an axiom of K.  
(ii) If [Bi] is [A], then [T]|-K [A => Bi], since [T]|-K [A => A].  
(iii) If there exist j, k less than i such that [Bk] is [Bj => Bi], then, by the inductive 
hypothesis, [T]|-K [A => Bj], and [T]|-K [A => (Bj => Bi)]. Hence, [T]|-K [A => 
Bi]. 
(iv) Finally, suppose there is some j < i such that [Bi] is [(Ax)Bi], where x is a 
variable in K. By hypothesis, [T]|-K [A => Bj]. Since x is not a free variable of 
[A], we have that [(Ax)(A => Bj) => (A => (Ax)Bj] is PA-provable. Since [T]|-K 
[A => Bj], it follows by Generalisation that [T]|-K [(Ax)(A => Bj)], and so [T]|-K 
[A => (Ax)Bj], i.e. [T]|-K [A => Bi].  
                                               
7 The converse is trivially true (cf. [Sh67], p33). 
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This completes the induction, and Meta-theorem 1 follows as the special case where i = 
n. ¶8 
2.1  A number-theoretic corollary 
Now, Gödel has defined ([Go31], p22, Definition 45(6)) a primitive recursive number-
theoretic relation xB(K, [T])y that holds if, and only if, x is the Gödel-number of a 
deduction from T of the K-formula whose Gödel-number is y.  
We thus have: 
Corollary 1.19: If the Gödel-number of the well-formed K-formula [B] is b, and that of 
the well-formed K-formula [A => B] is c, then Meta-theorem 1 holds if, and only if10: 
(Ex)xB(K, [T], [A])b => (Ez)zB(K, [T])c 
2.2  An extended Deduction Theorem 
We next consider the meta-proposition:  
Corollary 1.2: If we assume Church’s Thesis11, then Meta-theorem 1 holds even if the 
premise ([T], [A])|-K [B] is established meta-mathematically, assuming the consistency of 
([T], [A]), but a deduction <[B1], [B2], ..., [Bn]> of [B] from ([T], [A]) in K is not known 
explicitly. 
                                               
8 We use the symbol “¶” as an end-of-proof marker. 
 
9 We note that Corollary 1.1 and Corollary 2.2 may be essentially different number-theoretic assertions, 
which, in the absence of a formal proof, cannot be assumed to be equivalent. 
 
10 We note that this symbolically expresses a meta-equivalence in a recursive arithmetic RA, based on a 
semantic interpretation of the definition of the primitive recursive relation xB(K, [T])y; it is not a K-formula. 
 
11 Church’s Thesis: A number-theoretic function is effectively computable if, and only if, it is recursive 
([Me64], p147, footnote). We appeal explicitly to Church’s Thesis here to avoid implicitly assuming that 
every recursive relation is algorithmically decidable. 
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Proof: Since Gödel’s number-theoretic relation xB(K, [T])y is primitive recursive, it 
follows that, if we assume Church’s Thesis - which implies that a number-theoretic 
relation is decidable if, and only if, it is recursive - we can effectively determine some 
finite natural number n for which the assertion nB(K, [T], [A])b holds, where the Gödel-
number of the well-formed K-formula [B] is b.  
Since n would then, by definition, be the Gödel-number of a deduction <[B1], [B2], ..., 
[Bn]> of [B] from ([T], [A]) in K, we may thus constructively conclude, from the meta-
mathematically determined assertion ([T], [A])|-K [B], that some deduction <[B1], [B2], ..., 
[Bn]> of [B] from ([T], [A]) in K can, indeed, be effectively determined. Meta-theorem 1 
follows. ¶ 
3.  An additional Deduction Theorem 
We, finally, argue that:  
Meta-theorem 2: If K is an arbitrary first order theory, and if [A] is a closed well-formed 
formula of K, then ([T], [A])|-K [B] holds if, and only if, [T]|-K [B] holds when we assume 
that [T]|-K [A] holds. 
Proof: First, if there is a deduction <[B1], [B2], ..., [Bn]> of [B] from ([T], [A]) in K, and 
there is a deduction, <[A1], [A2], ..., [Am]>, of [A] from [T] in K, then <[A1], [A2], ..., [Am], 
[B1], [B2], ..., [Bn]> is a deduction of [B] from [T] in K. Hence, if ([T], [A])|-K [B] holds, 
then [T]|-K [B] holds when we assume [T]|-K [A]. 
Second, if there is a deduction <[B1], [B2], ..., [Bn]> of [B] from [T] in K, then we have, 
trivially, that, if [T]|-K [B] holds when we assume [T]|-K [A], then ([T], [A])|-K [B] holds. 
Last, we assume that there is no deduction, <[B1], [B2], ..., [Bn]>, of [B] from [T] in K. If, 
now, [T]|-K' [B] holds when we assume that [T]|-K' [A] holds in any extension K' of K, 
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then, if we assume that there is a sequence <[A1], [A2], ..., [Am]> of well-formed K'-
formulas such that [Am] is [A] and, for each m >= i >= 1, either [Ai] is an axiom of K', or 
[Ai] is in [T], or [Ai] is a direct consequence by some rules of inference of K' of some of 
the preceding well-formed formulas in the sequence, then it follows from our hypothesis12 
that we can show, by induction on the deduction length n, that there is a sequence <[B1], 
[B2], ..., [Bn]> of well-formed K-formulas such that [B1] is [A]13, [Bn] is [B] and, for each 
i > 1, either [Bi] is an axiom of K, or [Bi] is in [T], or [Bi] is a direct consequence by some 
rules of inference of K of some of the preceding well-formed formulas in the sequence.  
In other words, if there is a deduction, <[A1], [A2], ..., [Am]>, of [A] from [T] in K', then, 
by our hypothesis, <[A], [B2], ..., [Bn]> is a deduction of [B] from ([T], [A]) in K'. By 
definition, it follows that <[A], [B2], ..., [Bn]> is, then, a deduction of [B] from ([T], [A]) 
in K. We thus have that, if [T]|-K [B] holds when we assume [T]|-K [A], then ([T], [A])|-K 
[B] holds.  This completes the proof. ¶ 
In view of Corollary 1.2, we thus have: 
Corollary 2.1: If we assume Church’s Thesis, and if [A] is a closed well-formed formula 
of K, then we may conclude that [T]|-K ([A] => [B]) holds if [T]|-K [B] holds when we 
assume [T]|-K [A].14 
We note that, in the notation of Corollary 1.1, if the Gödel-number of the well-formed K-
formula [A] is a, then Corollary 2.1 holds if, and only if15: 
                                               
12 That [T]|-K [A] holds. 
 
13 [A] is, thus, the hypothesis in the sequence; it is the only well-formed K-formula in the sequence that is 
not an axiom of K, not in [T], and not a direct consequence of the axioms of K by any rules of inference of 
K. 
 
14 We give a model-theoretic proof of Corollary 2.1 in the Appendix.  
 
15 We note that this, too, is not a K-formula, but a semantic meta-equivalence, based on the definition of the 
primitive recursive relation xB(K, [T])y. 
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Corollary 2.2: ((Ex)xB(K, [T])a  => (Eu)uB(K, [T])b) => (Ez)zB(K, [T])c. 
4.  Conclusion 
We have argued that Meta-theorem 2 is a valid Deduction Theorem of any first order 
theory. However, standard interpretations of Gödel’s reasoning and conclusions are 
inconsistent with the consequences of this Meta-theorem in an arbitrary first order 
theory16. Hence, in the absence of constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, 
reasons for denying the applicability of the Meta-theorem, and of its Corollary 2.1, to a 
first order theory, such interpretations ought not to be considered as definitive.  
Appendix 1: A model-theoretic proof of Corollary 2.1 
We note that there is a model-theoretic proof of Corollary 2.1. The case [T]|-K [B] is 
straightforward.  
If [T]|-K [B] does not hold, then, as noted in Meta-theorem 2, if [T]|-K [B] holds when we 
assume [T]|-K [A], then there is a sequence <[B1], [B2], ..., [Bn]> of well-formed K-
formulas such that [B1] is [A], [Bn] is [B] and, for each i > 1, either [Bi] is an axiom of K, 
or [Bi] is in [T], or [Bi] is a direct consequence by some rules of inference of K of some of 
the preceding well-formed formulas in the sequence.  
(We note that if [T] is the set of well-formed K-formulas {[T1], [T2], ..., [Tl]} then ([T] & 
[A]) denotes the well-formed K-formula [T1 & T2 & ..., Tl & A], and, (T & A) denotes its 
interpretation in M, i.e., T1 & T2 & ..., Tl & A.) 
If, now, any well-formed formula in ([T], [A]) is false under an interpretation M of K, 
then (T & A) => B is vacuously true in M.  
                                                                                                                                            
 
16 See Appendix 2. 
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If, however, all the well-formed formulas in ([T], [A]) are true under interpretation in M, 
then the sequence <[B1], [B2], ..., [Bn]> interprets as a deduction in M, since the 
interpretation preserves the axioms and rules of inference of K (cf. [Me64], p57). Thus 
[B] is true in M, and so is (T & A) => B. 
In other words, we cannot have ([T], [A]) true, and [B] false, under interpretation in M, as 
this would imply that there is some extension K' of K in which [T]|-K' [A], but not [T]|-K' 
[B]; this would contradict our hypothesis, which implies that, in any extension K' of K in 
which we have [T]|-K' [A], we also have [T]|-K' [B]. 
Hence, (T & A) => B is true in all models of K. By a consequence of Gödel’s 
Completeness Theorem for an arbitrary first order theory ([Me64], p68, Corollary 
2.15(a)), it follows that |-K ([T] & [A]) => [B]); and, ipso facto, that [T]|-K ([A] => [B]). 
Appendix 2: Gödel’s reasoning and Corollary 2.1 
In his seminal 1931 paper [Go31], Gödel meta-mathematically argues that, assuming any 
formal system of Peano Arithmetic, PA, is simply consistent, we can define an 
“undecidable” PA-proposition, [(Ax)R(x)], such that (cf. [Go31], #1, p25): 
If [(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable, then [~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable.17 
Now, by Corollary 2.1, it should follow that: 
 [(Ax)R(x) => ~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable, 
and, therefore, that: 
                                               
17 Gödel essentially argues, number-theoretically, that, if the Gödel-number of [(Ax)R(x)] is 17Genr, and if 
this formula is PA-provable, then the PA-formula whose Gödel-number is Neg(17Genr), i.e., [~(Ax)R(x)], 
is also PA-provable if PA is assumed simply consistent. 
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[~(Ax)R(x)] is PA-provable. 
Since Gödel also proved that, if PA is assumed simply consistent, then [R(n)] is PA-
provable for any, given, natural number n, Corollary 2.1 implies that PA is omega-
inconsistent.  
(We note that Gödel defined a first order theory K as omega-consistent if, and only if, for 
every well-formed formula [F(x)] of K, if |-K[F(n)] for every numeral [n], then it is not 
the case that |-K(Ex)F(x) (cf. [Me64], p142; see also [Go31], p23-24). 
However, this conclusion is inconsistent with standard interpretations of Gödel’s 
reasoning, which, first, assert both [(Ax)R(x)] and [~(Ax)R(x)] as PA-unprovable, and, 
second, assume that PA can be omega-consistent18. Such interpretations, therefore, 
implicitly deny that the PA-provability of [~(Ax)R(x)] can be inferred from the above 
meta-argument; ipso facto, they imply that Corollary 2.1 is false. 
References  
[Ch37] Church, A. 1937. Introduction to Mathematical Logic. Dover, New York. 
[Go31] Gödel, Kurt. 1931. On formally undecidable propositions of Principia 
Mathematica and related systems I. Translated by Elliott Mendelson. In M. 
Davis (ed.). 1965. The Undecidable. Raven Press, New York. 
[Me64] Mendelson, Elliott. 1964. Introduction to Mathematical Logic. Van Norstrand, 
Princeton.  
[Sh67] Shoenfield, J. R. 1967. Mathematical Logic. Association for Symbolic Logic, 
Urbana. 
                                               
18 We note that Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems assume significance only if we presume that the 
arithmetic, in which they are derived, can be omega-consistent (cf. [Go31], p23-24) 
